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Abstract
We propose an incomplete information analogue of rationalizability. An action is said
to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process.

At

each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some
conjecture that puts weight only on pro…les of types of other players and states that that
type thinks possible, combined with actions of those types that have survived so far. We
describe a number of applications.
This solution concept characterizes the implications of equilibrium when a player is
known to have some private information but may have additional information. It thus answers the "informational robustness" question of what can we say about the set of outcomes
that may arise in equilibrium of a Bayesian game if players may observe some additional
information.
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Introduction

We propose a de…nition of incomplete information rationalizability. A player’s possibilities are
the set of states that he believes possible. Suppose that we …x each player’s possibilities, his
possibilities about others’possibilities, and so on (his "higher-order possibilities"). An action
is belief-free rationalizable for a given higher-order possibility type if it survives the following
iterated deletion process. A conjecture of a player is a belief about other players’action pro…les,
their higher-order possibilities and a payo¤ relevant state. At each stage of an iterated deletion,
delete for each type the set of actions that are not a best response to any conjecture that
assigns probability zero to (i) states that that type considers impossible; and (ii) action and type
combinations of other players that have already been deleted.
This paper makes a number of contributions. First, we propose this new solution concept
for incomplete information games. Second, we study the implication of this solution concept in
a number of important economic applications. And third, we show that the solution concept
captures the idea of informational robustness: what can we say about rational play in a given
environment if we know that players have a certain amount of private information - about payo¤
relevant states and others’private information - but cannot rule out the possibility that players
have additional information? The new solution concept also provides a benchmark for a larger
literature looking at informational robustness, which we review.
With respect to the economic applications, we …rst consider the payo¤-type environments,
where each player knows his own payo¤-type and thinks every payo¤-type pro…le of other players
is possible.

In this case, belief-free rationalizability has a simpler characterization.

In this

setting, a player’s payo¤-type is a su¢ cient condition for his higher-order possibility type. Now
we can iteratively delete actions for each payo¤-type that are not a best response to some belief
about others’ payo¤-types and actions that puts zero probability on action - payo¤-type pairs
that have already been deleted. Players have unique rationalizable actions if their utilities are
su¢ ciently insensitive to others’ types.

We provide a tight characterization of when there is

su¢ cient insensitivity to obtain a unique outcome, in linear best response games; we also describe
how this result extends to a class of games where each player’s utility depends on some su¢ cient
statistic of all other players’payo¤-types.
We then depart from known payo¤-type environments, and consider two-player two-action
games where each player is choosing between a risky action and a safe action. The safe action
2

always gives a payo¤ of zero.

The payo¤ to the risky action depends on the other player’s

action and the payo¤ state. The payo¤ to the risky action when the other player takes the safe
action is always negative, and can be interpreted as the cost of taking the risky action. Two
important applications, within this class of games, are studied. In coordination games - where
if both players take the risky action, the payo¤s of the players always have the same sign - we
interpret the risky action as "invest". In trading games - where if both players take the risky
action, the payo¤s of the players have di¤erent signs - we interpret the risky action as accepting
a trade. The safe action ("don’t invest" or "reject trade") is always belief-free rationalizable in
these games. We characterize when the risky action ("invest" or "accept trade") is belief-free
rationalizable. An event is said to be commonly possible for a player if he thinks that the event
is possible (i.e., assigns it strictly positive probability), thinks that it is possible that both the
event is true and that the other player thinks it is possible; and so on. Invest (the risky action
in the coordination game) is belief-free rationalizable for a player if and only if it is a common
possibility for that player that the payo¤ from both players investing is positive.

Accepting

trade (the risky action in the trading game) is belief-free rationalizable for a player if and only if
an analogous iterated statement about possibility is true: (i) each player thinks that it is possible
that he gains from trade; (ii) each player thinks it is possible that both he gains from trade and
that (i) holds for the other player; and so on.
To understand the informational robustness foundations of belief-free rationalizability, suppose we start with a fully-speci…ed type space, including players’beliefs as well the support of
those beliefs (i.e., the set of states and others’types that are thought possible). Now suppose
that players started with the information in that type space but were able to observe additional
information. What can we say about a player’s updated beliefs? One restriction is that that
player cannot assign positive probability to something that was not thought possible. But for
some subjective interpretation of the signals a player observes, there will be no other restrictions
on what updated beliefs might look like. But our de…nition of belief-free rationalizability exactly
captures these assumptions: the support of beliefs is …xed but not the exact probabilities.
We can also use belief-free rationalizability to understand a larger literature on informational
robustness. Belief-free rationalizability is permissive because it allows players to observe payo¤relevant information and does not impose the common prior assumption.

If one allows only

payo¤-irrelevant information, i.e., correlating devices, but still without imposing the common
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prior assumption, then we get the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel,
Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)). If one imposes the common prior assumption, but allow payo¤relevant information, then we get Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris (2016a)).1
If one imposes both the common prior assumption and payo¤- irrelevant information, then one
gets the belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium studied in Liu (2015). The following table
now summarizes these relationships between the solution concepts:
payo¤-relevant signals

payo¤-irrelevant signals only

non common prior belief-free rationalizability
common prior

interim correlated rationalizability

Bayes correlated equilibrium belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium

Under complete information - the solution concepts without the common prior assumption
reduce to the standard notion of correlated rationalizability (Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)),
while both correlated equilibrium notions (with the common prior assumption) reduce to the
standard notion of (objective) correlated equilibrium Aumann (1987).
One contribution of this paper is to then provide a uni…ed description for informational
robustness foundations of these solutions concepts.

In each case, we characterize what can

happen in (Bayes Nash) equilibrium if we allow players to observe additional information as
described above. These informational robustness foundations follow Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987) and Aumann (1987) in showing even if one makes the strong (and perhaps unjusti…ed2 )
assumption of equilibrium, one cannot remove the possibility of rationalizable play or correlated
equilibrium distributions being played if payo¤-irrelevant signals are observed (not imposing or
imposing the common prior assumption, respectively, in the two cases).
The formal statements in Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann (1987) have the informational robustness statements described above.3 However, both papers interpret their results
informally as establishing foundations for solution concepts by establishing that they correspond
1

In recent work, we have argued that Bayes correlated equilibrium is the relevant tool for characterizing

(common prior) robust predictions in games as well as information design (Bergemann and Morris (2013) and
Bergemann and Morris (2016b)).
2
There is a potential tension between assuming equilibrium - a solution concept that has correct common beliefs
built into it - in environments where the common prior assumption is not satis…ed.

Thus Dekel, Fudenberg,

and Levine (2004) argue that natural learning justi…cations that would explain equilibrium in an incomplete
information setting would also give rise to a learning justi…cation of common prior beliefs.
3
Thus Proposition 2.1 of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), while stated in the language of interim payo¤s,
established that the set of actions played in an appropriate version of subjective correlated equilibrium equals
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to the implications of common certainty of rationality,4 with or without the common prior assumption: imposing common certainty of rationality is formally equivalent to the assumption
of equilibrium on the commonly certain component of the type space. The later literature on
"epistemic foundations" has developed more formal statements of these results as consequence of
common certainty of rationality.5 In the current paper, we deliberately focus on a narrower informational robustness interpretation of the results both because this is the interpretation that is
relevant for our applications and because the modern epistemic foundations literature addresses
a wide set of important but subtle issues that are relevant for the epistemic interpretation but
moot for our informational robustness interpretation.

Desiderata that are important in the

modern epistemic foundations literature are therefore not addressed, including (i) the removal
of reference to players’beliefs about their own types or counterfactual belief of types (Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995)); (ii) restricting attention to state spaces that re‡ect "expressible"
statements about the model (Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008) and Battigalli, Di Tillio,
Grillo, and Penta (2011)); (iii) giving an interim interpretation of the common prior assumption (Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014)). Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) introduced the notion of
" -rationalizability" for both complete and incomplete information environments, building in
arbitrary restrictions on the beliefs of any type about other players’types and actions, and states.
Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011) describes how interim correlated rationalizability
(in general) and belief-free rationalizability (in the case of payo¤-type environments) are special
cases of " -rationalizability", where particular restrictions are placed on beliefs about other
players’types and states. Belief-free rationalizability could also be given a

-rationalizability

the set of correlated rationalizable actions. The main theorem of Aumann (1987) showed that under assumptions equivalent to Bayes Nash equilibrium on a common prior type space with payo¤-irrelevant signals, the ex
ante distribution of play corresponds to an (objective) correlated equilibrium. Aumann (1974) has an explicit
informational robustness motivation.
4
Aumann (1987) notes in the introduction that he assumes "common knowledge that each player chooses a
strategy that maximizes his expected utility given his information". Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) write in
the introduction that their approach "starts from the assumption that the rationality of the players is common
knowledge." We follow the recent literature in replacing the term "knowledge" in the expression common knowledge because it corresponds to "belief with probability 1," rather than "true belief" (the meaning of knowledge
in philosophy and general discourse). We use "certainty" to mean "belief with probability 1".
5
Thus Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014) state a modern version of the main result of Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987) as Theorem 1 and a (somewhat) more modern statement of Aumann (1987) in Section 4.6.2.

5

formulation, outside of payo¤-type environments, where the corresponding type-dependent restriction on beliefs would be on the support of the beliefs only.
There are two important special cases where belief-free rationalizability has already been applied in payo¤-type environments. A leading example of a payo¤-type environment is a private
values environment (where a player’s payo¤ depends only on his own payo¤-type), and Chen,
Micali, and Pass (2015) have proposed what we are calling belief-free rationalizability in this
context and used it for novel results on robust revenue maximization. Payo¤-type environments
without private values were the focus of earlier work of ours on robust mechanism design collected in Bergemann and Morris (2012); and we report here translations of our mechanism design
results on payo¤-type environments to general games.6 Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta
(2011) studied - and used the name - "belief-free rationalizability" in the context of payo¤-type
environments.

We used Bayes correlated equilibrium (in the special case of payo¤-type envi-

ronments) in Bergemann and Morris (2008). The uni…ed treatment of informational robustness
thus also embeds both our earlier work on robust mechanism design and our more recent work
on robust predictions in games (Bergemann and Morris (2013), (2016)).
The informational-robustness results in this paper concern what happens if players observe
extra signals about payo¤s, but without allowing payo¤ perturbations.

A related but di¤er-

ent strand of the literature (Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine (1988), Kajii and Morris (1997)
and Weinstein and Yildiz (2007)) examines the robustness of equilibrium predictions to payo¤
perturbations about which players face uncertainty.
We de…ne the notion of belief-free rationalizability in Section 2. We develop the implications
of belief-free rationalizability in a number of applications in Section 3. We relate belief-free
rationalizability to three other, previously introduced, solution concepts in Section 4.

There

we also give uni…ed informational-robustness foundations for all of these solution concepts. In
the …nal Section 5, we discuss the support assumption and relate it the notion of a posteriori
equilibrium of Aumann (1974) in complete information games.
6

Our working paper, Bergemann and Morris (2007), covered some of the same material as this paper for

payo¤-type environments and is thus incorporated in this paper.

6

2

Setting and Belief Free Rationalizability

We will …x a …nite set of players 1; :::; I and a …nite set of payo¤-relevant states

.

We divide a standard description of an incomplete information game into a "basic game"
and a "type space".

A basic game G = (Ai ; ui )Ii=1 consists of, for each player, a …nite set of

possible actions Ai and a payo¤ function ui : A
space T = (Ti ;

I
i )i=1

! R where A = A1

AI . A type

consists of, for each player, a …nite set of types Ti and, for each player, a

belief over others’types and the state,
consists of a basic game G

= (Ai ; ui )Ii=1

i

: Ti !

(T

). An incomplete information game

i

I
i )i=1 .

and a type space T = (Ti ;

In de…ning belief-free rationalizability, it is only the support of

i

(ti ) that matters, not the

(strictly positive) probabilities assigned to elements of that support.

We allow the implied

redundancies in our description of the type space to facilitate later comparisons with other
solution concepts.
We de…ne belief-free rationalizability inductively as follows. Suppose BF Rin (ti ) describes the
n th level (belief-free) rationalizable actions for type ti of agent i. Write BF Rn for the pro…le
of correspondences where each BF Rin is a non-empty correspondence BF Rin : Ti ! 2Ai ?. We

will say that ai is not (belief-free) dominated for type ti with respect to BF Rn if there exists a

conjecture over pro…les of other players’actions, types and payo¤ relevant states, whose support
is consistent with BF Rn and the support of that type’s beliefs. Thus writing BF Rin (ti ) for the
set of actions that survive n rounds of deletion, we let BF Ri0 (ti ) = Ai , let BF Rin+1 (ti ) be the
set of actions for which there exists a conjecture

i

2

(T

i

A

i

) such that

n
i (a i ; t i ; ) > 0 ) aj 2 BF Rj (tj ) for each j 6= i;
X
(2)
i (a i ; t i ; ) > 0 ) i (t i ; jti ) > 0 for each t i ; ;

(1)

a

i

(3) ai 2 arg max
a0i

a

X

i

(a i ; t i ; ) ui ((a0i ; a i ) ; ) ;

i ;t i ;

and let
BF Ri (ti ) =

\

BF Rin (ti ) .

n 1

De…nition 1 (Belief-Free Rationalizable)
Action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti (in game (G; T )) if ai 2 BF Ri (ti ).

7

(1)

Note that this de…nition is independent of a type’s numerical beliefs and depends only on
which pro…les of other players’ types and states he considers possible, i.e., the support of his
beliefs.

3

Applications of Belief-Free Rationalizability

In this section, we investigate the implications of belief-free rationalizability in some well-known
economic environments: …rst, linear best response games and, second, coordination and trading
games.

3.1

Payo¤-Type Environments and Linear Best-Response Games

We …rst study payo¤-type environments.

We suppose that each player i has a payo¤-type

that he knows; and that the payo¤ state

is just the pro…le of players’payo¤-types,

=(

i

I
i )i=1 .

This assumption is maintained in many settings (including throughout our own work on robust
mechanism design collected in Bergemann and Morris (2012)).

We will also maintain a full

support assumption: all types of all players - while knowing their own payo¤-types - think that
every pro…le of others’ payo¤-types are possible (this assumption was implicit in our work on
robust mechanism design). Under these assumptions, a payo¤-type is a su¢ cient statistic for a
player’s higher-order possibilities, since every type is certain of his own payo¤-type and there is
common certainty that no player is ever certain of anything else. Thus we can identify types
with payo¤-types for purposes of de…ning belief-free rationalizability. The de…nition of belief-free
rationalizability now simpli…es. Writing BF Rin ( i ) for the set of actions that survive n rounds
of deletion, we have BF Ri0 (ti ) = Ai , BF Rin+1 ( i ) equal to the set of actions for which there
exists a conjecture

i

2

(A

i)

i

such that

> 0 ) aj 2 BF Rjn ( j ) for each j 6= i;
X
0
(2) ai 2 arg max
i (a i ;
i ) ui ((ai ; a i ) ; ( i ;
i )) ;
(1)

i

(a i ;

i)

a0i

a

i;

i

and
BF Ri ( i ) =

\

BF Rin ( i ) .

n 1

We illustrate belief-free rationalizability in payo¤-type spaces by considering a linear bestresponse game. Such games arise in a wide variety of settings (and arose endogenously out of
8

a mechanism design problem in our prior work, e.g. Bergemann and Morris (2009)). For this
section, we will have continuum - instead of …nite - actions and payo¤-types. We could formally
extend our earlier de…nitions to such continuum action type settings straightforwardly but at the
expense of additional notation and quali…cations.
So suppose now that Ai =
i

2

(A

i

i ).

i

= [0; 1] for all i and that agent i has payo¤-type

i

and belief

We suppose that agent i has a best response to set his action equal to:
!
X
ai = i + E i
(aj
(2)
j) .
j6=i

Thus each player wants to set his action equal to the payo¤ state

i

but make a linear

adjustment based on the distance of others’actions from their payo¤-types. If the parameter
is positive, then this is a game with strategic complementarities, while a negative

corresponds

to a game with strategic substitutes. Many payo¤s could give rise to this best response function.
In particular, this best response function could arise from a common interest game:
ui (a; ) = v (a; )
I
X
=
(aj
j=1

I
X

=

(aj

j)

"

(aj

+

#

(ak

k)

k6=j

I
X

2
j)

j=1

for some

j)

X

(aj

j)

j=1

X

(ak

k) ;

k6=j

2 R. In this case, a player’s utility from choosing action ai is
E i (vjai ; i ) =
a

Z

i;

i

I
X

(aj

2
j)

+

j=1

I
X

(aj

j)

j=1

X

!

(ak

k)

k6=j

d i:

The …rst-order condition for this problem is then:
dE i (vjai ; i )
=
dai

2 (ai

i)

2 E

i

X

(aj

j)

j6=i

!

;

and setting this equal to zero gives agent i’s best response (2). This game has a unique ex post
equilibrium, where each player sets his action equal to his payo¤-type.
rationalizable actions are:

8
1
< f g , if
<
i
I 1
BF Ri ( i ) =
: [0; 1] , otherwise.
9

<

1
;
I 1

The set of belief-free

This can be shown inductively:
h
n
BF Rik ( i ) , max 0;

If j j <

1
,
I 1

i

(j j (I

o
n
1))k ; min 1;

i + (j j (I

1))k

oi

.

the set of kth-level rationalizable actions shrinks at every iteration. If j j >

1
,
I 1

the

bounds on the kth-level rationalizable actions explode so no action is excluded. In Bergemann
and Morris (2009) we show how this logic can be generalized to asymmetric linear best response
games when the best response function of player i is given by:
!
X
ai = i E i
j) ;
ij (aj
j6=i

and to general games where a player’s best response is monotonic in his payo¤ state and an aggregate statistic of other players’actions. In both cases, there is a unique belief-free rationalizable
action if and only if players’utilities are not too sensitive to other players’payo¤-types.

3.2

Binary Actions: Coordination and Trade

We now consider some classic economic problems - coordination and trade. For simplicity, we
focus our attention on a class of two-player two-action games where the payo¤s in state

2

are given by:
Risky
Risky x1 ( )
Safe

Safe
c; x2 ( )

0; c

c

c; 0 ;

(3)

0; 0

where the risky payo¤ (x1 ( ) ; x2 ( )) 2 R2 depends on the realized payo¤-state . We will
characterize belief-free rationalizable actions in this class of games, with additional restrictions
giving coordination and trading interpretations. Before presenting these characterizations, we
report a general language for discussing higher-order possibility and common possibility that is
useful in the characterization of rationalizable behavior in both classes of games.
3.2.1

Higher-Order and Common Possibility

For a …xed type space T , an event E is a subset of T

. "Possibility operators" are de…ned as

follows. We present the de…nitions here for two players and the generalization to many players

10

is immediate, but not necessary for our purpose here. We write Bi (E) for the set of types of
player i that think that E is possible:
8
9
<
=
9tj 2 Tj and 2 such that
Bi (E) = ti 2 Ti
.
:
((ti ; tj ) ; ) 2 E and i (tj ; jti ) > 0 ;

For a pair of events E1

T1 and E2

T2 , (E1 ; E2 ) are a common possibility for player i if:

1. player i thinks it is possible that Ei is true,
2. player i thinks it is possible that both (i) Ei is true; and (ii) player j thinks that Ej is
possible,
3. and so on... .
Thus if we write Ci (E1 ; E2 ) for the set of types of player i for whom (E1 ; E2 ) are a common
possibility, we have
Ci (E1 ; E2 ) = Bi (Ei ) \ Bi (Ei \ Bj (Ej )) \ Bi (Ei \ Bj (Ej \ Bi (Ei ))) \ ::::.
More formally, de…ne operators B1k and B2k on pairs of events by Bi0 (E1 ; E2 ) = Ti and Bik+1 (E1 ; E2 ) =
Bi Ei \ Bjk (Ej ) for each k = 1; 2:::, we have
Ci (E1 ; E2 ) =

\

Bik (E1 ; E2 ) .

(4)

k 1

The sequence Bik (E1 ; E2 ) is decreasing under set inclusion for each i. Thus this de…nition of
common possibility also has a well-de…ned …xed point characterization:
Lemma 1 (Common Possibility as Fixed Point)
Let F1

T1 and F2

T2 be the largest sets of types satisfying F1

B1 (E1 \ F2 ) and F2

B2 (E2 \ F2 ). Then Ci (E1 ; E2 ) = Fi .
The de…nition given by (4) describes a concept of common possibility for a pair of events
(E1 ; E2 ) for the two players. If we are only interested in a single event, and we can adapt the
above de…nitions to a single event E1 = E2 = E, so that event E is a common possibility for
player i if:
11

1. player i thinks it is possible that E is true,
2. player i thinks it is possible that both (i) E is true; and (ii) player j thinks that E is
possible,
3. and so on... .
We will write Ci (E) as shorthand for Ci (E; E), and so
Ci (E) = Bi (E) \ Bi (E \ Bj (E)) \ Bi (E \ Bj (E \ Bi (E))) \ ::::.;
and this is equivalent to inductively de…ning
Bi0 (E) = Ti and Bik+1 (E) = Bi E \ Bjk (E) ;
and setting
Ci (E) =

\

Bik (E) .

k 1

3.2.2

Coordination Games

We now return to the two person two action game described by (3) above. For the class of
coordination games, de…ne

G

to be the set of "good" payo¤ states where both players strictly

bene…t if both take the risky action ("invest"); thus
G

De…ne

B

=f 2

jx1 ( ) > c and x2 ( ) > cg .

to be the set of "bad" payo¤ states where both players are strictly made worse o¤

even if both take the risky action; thus
B

=f 2

jx1 ( ) < c and x2 ( ) < cg .

Here, c has the interpretation that it is a cost of investment that is occurred independent of
whether others invest. We will de…ne a coordination game to be a situation where all states are
either good or bad, so that
=

G

12

[

B.

To remove uninteresting cases based on indi¤erence, this de…nition excludes the possibility that
xi ( ) = c. We write EG and EB for the set of states where the payo¤ state is good and bad,
respectively, so
EG = f(t; ) j 2

Gg

and EB = f(t; ) j 2

Bg.

In coordination games, at all good states, the corresponding complete information game has two
strict Nash equilibria (both invest and both not invest), while at all bad states, both players
have a strictly dominant strategy to not invest. Now we have:
Proposition 1 (Belief-Free Rationalizability in Coordination Game)
In a coordination game, the safe action (not invest) is always belief-free rationalizable; the risky
action (invest) is belief-free rationalizable for player i if and only if the event EG is a common
possibility for player i.
The …rst claim follows immediately because both not invest is always a strict Nash equilibrium
For the second claim, observe that Bik (EG ) is

of the underlying complete information game.

the set of types of agent i for whom invest is kth level belief-free rationalizable. This follows
by induction since Bi0 (EG ) = Ti corresponds to the set of types for whom invest is 0th level
belief-free rationalizable; and, if Bjk (EG ) is the set of types of player j for whom invest is kth
level belief-free rationalizable, then invest is (k + 1)th level rationalizable for player i only if he
attaches positive probability to EG \ Bjk (EG ) : But - by de…nition - the set of types of player i

for which this is true is exactly Bik+1 EG \ Bik (EG ) , so we have our induction.
3.2.3

Trading Games

We now want to consider a class of trading games where the safe action is interpreted as no
trade and the risky action is interpreted as (agreeing to) trade. For this exercise, we think of
c as being very small and corresponding to a small transaction cost associated with agreeing to
trade. But trade will only take place if both players agree to trade. Let

i

be the set of

"i gain (payo¤) states" where trade is bene…cial for player i, but not for player j, so
i

=f 2

jxi ( ) > c and xj ( ) < cg .

De…ne a trading game to be a situation where all states are gain states for exactly one player,
so that
=

1
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[

2.

True zero-sum trade would require that x1 ( ) + x2 ( ) = 0 for all , while a weaker non-positive
sum trade requirement would be that x1 ( ) + x2 ( )

0 for all . We do not use either of these

restrictions for our results and we would not get sharper results if we imposed either of them.
Now write Ei+ for the set of states and types corresponding to i-gain payo¤ state for player i,
Ei+ = f(t; ) j 2

ig.

Now we have:
Proposition 2 (Belief-Free Rationalizability in Trading Game)
In a trading game, the safe action (reject trade) is always belief-free rationalizable; the risky
action (accept trade) is belief-free rationalizable for player i if and only if the events E1+ ; E2+
are a common possibility for player i.
The …rst claim is immediate because, in a trading game, the strictly positive cost c implies
that there is always a strict equilibrium where each player never trades, which in turn implies that
rejecting trade must be belief-free rationalizable. For the second claim, observe that Bik Ei+ ; Ej+
is the set of types of player i for whom trade is kth level belief-free rationalizable. This follows
by induction: Bi0 Ei+ ; Ej+ = Ti corresponds to the set of types from whom accepting trade is
0th level belief-free rationalizable; and if Bjk Ej+ ; Ei+ is the set of types of player j for whom
accepting trade is k-th level belief-free rationalizable, then trade is (k + 1)-th level belief-free
rationalizable for player i only if he attaches positive probability to Ei \ Bjk Ej+ ; Ei+ . But - by
de…nition - the set of types of player i for which this is true is exactly Bik+1 Ei+ \ Bjk Ej+ ; Ei+

;

so we have our induction.
We follow Morris and Skiadas (2000) in proving a no trade result under rationalizability.7
While they did not explicitly use belief-free rationalizability as a solution concept, their results
are remain true as stated for this de…nition and our proposition is essentially the same as theirs,
although their characterization is expressed in very di¤erent language.

In the working paper

version of this paper Bergemann and Morris (2015), we show how our characterization reduces
to the one reported there.
7

Morris and Skiadas (2000) maintained the payo¤ type assumption, so that trades were conditional on only

the type pro…le.
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4

Solution Concepts and Informational Robustness

We now discuss three more solution concepts in order to put belief-free rationalizability in context
and provide uni…ed informational-robustness foundations of solution concepts.

4.1

Three More Solution Concepts

First, consider interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)), which
is a re…nement of belief-free rationalizability. An action is interim correlated rationalizable for a
type ti if we iteratively delete actions which are not a best response to any supporting conjecture
over other players’actions and types, as well as states, which (1) puts probability 1 on action
type pro…les which have survived the iterated deletion procedure so far, and (2) has a marginal
belief over others’types and states which is consistent with that type’s beliefs on the type space.
Crucially, this de…nition allows arbitrary correlation in the supporting conjecture as long as (1)
and (2) are satis…ed. Formally, let ICRi0 (ti ) = Ai and let ICRin+1 (ti ) equal the set of actions
for which there exists

i

2

(A

i

T

i

) such that

n
i (a i ; t i ; ) > 0 ) aj 2 ICRj (tj ) for each j 6= i;
X
(2)
i (a i ; t i ; ) = i (t i ; jti ) for each t i ; ;

(1)

a

i

(3) ai 2 arg max
a0i

a

X

i

(5)

(a i ; t i ; ) ui ((a0i ; a i ) ; ) ;

i ;t i ;

and let
ICRi (ti ) =

\

ICRin (ti ) .

n 1

De…nition 2 (Interim Correlated Rationalizable)
Action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti (in game (G; T )) if ai 2 ICRi (ti ).
We now consider two parallel de…nitions of (objective) incomplete information correlated
equilibrium for the same incomplete information game. Type space T = (Ti ;
common prior assumption if there exists
X

t0 i ;

2

) such that

(T

ti ; t0

0
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i

;

0

> 0;

I
i )i=1

satis…es the

for all i and ti , and
i

(t i ; jti ) = X
t0 i ;

((ti ; t i ) ; )
ti ; t0

i

;

0

;

0

for all i, (ti ; t i ) and .8
Now we have a common prior incomplete information game (G; T ). Behavior in this incomplete information game can be described by a decision rule mapping players’types and states to
a probability distribution over players’actions,

:T

!

(A). A decision rule

satis…es

belief-invariance if, for each player i,
i

(ai j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ,

X
a

i

((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; )

(6)

is independent of (t i ; ). Thus a decision rule satis…es belief-invariance if a player’s action does
not reveal any additional information to him about others’types and the state.

This property

has played an important role in the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium,
see, Forges (1993), Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010).

Notice that

property (2) in the iterative de…nition of interim correlated rationalizability in (5) was a beliefinvariance assumption.
Decision rule

satis…es obedience if

a

a

X
i ;t

i;

X

i ;t i ;

(ti ; t i ) ((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ui ((ai ; a i ) ; )
(ti ; t i ) ((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ui ((a0i ; a i ) ; ) .

for all i, ti 2 Ti and ai ; a0i 2 Ai . Obedience has the following mediator interpretation. Suppose
that an omniscient mediator knew players’types and the true state, randomly selected an action
pro…le according to

and privately informed each player of his recommended action. Would a

player who knew his own type and heard the mediator’s recommendation have an incentive to
follow the recommendation? Obedience says that he would want to follow the recommendation.
8

When the common prior assumption is maintained, we understand the common prior

to be implicitly

de…ned by the type space. In the (special) case where multiple common priors satisfy the above properties, our
results will hold true for any choice of common prior. By requiring that all types are assigned positive probability,
we are making a slightly stronger assumption than some formulations in the literature. This version simpli…es
the statement of our results and will also tie in with the support assumption that we impose in the informational
robustness foundations in Section 4.3.
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De…nition 3 (Belief Invariant Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BIBCE))
Decision rule

is a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium (BIBCE) if it satis…es obedience

and belief-invariance.
Liu (2015) described the subjective correlated equilibrium analogue of interim correlated
rationalizability. If one then imposes the common prior assumption (as he discusses in Section
5.2), then the version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium that one obtains is given
by De…nition 3.9 Its relation to the incomplete information correlated equilibrium literature is
further discussed in Bergemann and Morris (2016a): it is in general a weaker requirement than the
belief invariant Bayesian solution of Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010),
because - like interim correlated rationalizability - it allows unexplained correlation between types
and payo¤ states.

It is immediate from the de…nitions that any action played with positive

probability by a type in a belief-invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium is interim correlated
rationalizable.
De…nition 4 (Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE))
Decision rule

is a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) if it satis…es obedience.

This solution concept is studied in Bergemann and Morris (2016a).

It is immediate from

the de…nitions that any action played with positive probability by a type in a Bayes correlated
equilibrium is belief-free rationalizable.

4.2

Back to the Applications

We will selectively report what happens to some of our earlier applications under these three
additional solution concepts.
4.2.1

Payo¤-Type Spaces and Linear Best Response Games

The three new solution concepts lead to simpler statements and interpretations in the special
case of payo¤-type environments. In a payo¤-type environment, there is "distributed certainty":
9

Liu (2015) refers to what we are calling the belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium as the "common-prior

correlated equilibrium" (see De…nition 4 in Liu (2015)). We use the current language to emphasize the belief
invariance property relative to the Bayes correlated equilibrium itself.
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the join of players’information reveals the true state . But under this assumption, the "correlation" in interim correlated rationalizability is no longer relevant, and it is equivalent to interim
independent rationalizability; the belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium reduces to the
belief invariant Bayesian solution of Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010);
and Bayes correlated equilibrium reduces to the Bayesian solution of Forges (1993).
One can show that if
1

2

I

1

;1 ;

there is a unique Bayes correlated equilibrium in the linear best response example.
equilibrium, each player sets his action equal to his payo¤-type. Thus if 1 <

<

In this
1
,
I 1

then

there is a unique Bayes correlated equilibrium but all actions are belief-free rationalizable. This
follows from results in Bergemann and Morris (2008), via a potential game argument.
4.2.2

Binary Actions: Coordination and Trade

Higher-Order and Common Beliefs We now introduce belief operators analogous to the
possibility operators introduced earlier.

We will use both possibility and p-belief operators

to analyze the coordination and trading game under interim correlated rationality and beliefinvariant Bayes correlated equilibrium. We write Bip (E) for the set of types of player i who
assign probability at least p to event E,
8
<
p
Bi (E) = ti 2 Ti
:

X

i

f(tj ; )j((ti ;tj ); )2Eg

(tj ; jti )

p

9
=
;

.

The connection with possibility operators is that if a player assigns probability p to an event for
any p > 0, then he thinks that the event is possible:
Bi (E) =

[

Bip (E) :

p>0

Event E is repeated common p-belief for player i if:
1. player i assigns probability at least p to event E,
2. player i assigns probability at least p to the event that both (i) E is true; and (ii) player j
assigns probability at least p to event E;
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3. and so on... .
Now writing Cip (E) for the set of types of player i for whom event E is repeated common
p-belief, we have that
Cip (E) = Bip (E) \ Bip E \ Bjp (E) \ Bip E \ Bjp (E \ Bip (E)) \ ::::.;
and this is equivalent to inductively de…ning
Bip;0 (E) = Ti and Bip;k+1 (E) = Bip E \ Bjp;k (E) ;
and setting
Cip (E) = \ Bip;k (E) .
k 1

This de…nition of belief operators follows Monderer and Samet (1989) while the de…nition of
repeated common p-belief comes from Monderer and Samet (1996).10
Coordination We now focus on a more specialized class of coordination games. Suppose that
2

G

) x1 ( ) = x2 ( ) = x > c;

2

B

) x1 ( ) = x2 ( ) = 0:

Call this a simple coordination game.
Proposition 3 (Belief-Free Rationalizability in a Simple Coordination Game)
In a simple coordination game, the safe action (not invest) is always interim correlated rationalizable; the risky action (invest) is interim correlated rationalizable if and only if the event EG is
repeated common c=x-belief for player i.
Again, the …rst claim follows immediately because since both not invest is always a strict
Nash equilibrium of the underlying complete information game. For the second claim, note that
10

The de…nition of repeated common p-belief is closely related to the more widely used concept of common

p-belief introduced in Monderer and Samet (1989) given by
e p (E) = B p (E) \ B p (B p (E) \ B p (E)) \ B p (B p (B p (E) \ B p (E)) \ B p (B p (E) \ B p (E))) \ ::::.;
C
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
i
i
i
i

Monderer and Samet (1996) describe the close relationship between common p-belief and repeated common pbelief, which we omit here.
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invest is a best response for a player only if he attaches probability at least c=x to both the state
being good and his opponent choosing to invest. Now, analogously to belief-free rationalizability
c

;k

case, we can show by induction that Bix (EG ) is the set of types of agent i for whom invest is
c

;0

k th level belief-free rationalizable: Bix (E) = Ti is the set of types from whom invest is 0th
c

;k

level belief-free rationalizable, and, if Bjx (E) is the set of types of player j for whom invest is
kth level belief-free rationalizable, then invest is (k + 1)th level rationalizable for player i only if
c

;k

he attaches probability at least c=x to E \ Bjx (E) and so, again, we have our induction.
Because this is a game of strategic complementarities, and the largest and smallest rationalizable strategies (in the natural order) constitute equilibria, we have:
Proposition 4 (Belief Invariant BCE in a Simple Coordination Game)
In a simple coordination game, there is a belief-invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium where the
safe action (not invest) is always played.

There is another belief-invariant Bayes correlated

equilibrium where the risky action (not invest) is played by player i if and only if the event
EG is repeated common c=x-belief. All other belief-invariant Bayes correlated equilibria are "in
between" these two, in the sense that invest is never played if the event EG is not repeated common
c=x-belief.
The structure of Bayes correlated equilibria is more subtle in this example; see Bergemann
and Morris (2016a) for a discussion of the structure of Bayes correlated equilibria in two-player
two-action games of incomplete information.
Trading The characterization of belief-free rationalizability extends almost immediately to
interim correlated rationalizability:
Proposition 5 (Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Trading Game)
In a trading game, the safe action (reject trade) is always interim correlated rationalizable; the
risky action (accept trade) is interim correlated rationalizable for player i if and only if the events
(E1 ; E2 ) are a common possibility of player i.
To see why, it is enough to show that the inductive step that worked for belief-free rationalizability continues to work for interim correlated rationalizability.

In particular, suppose

that Ejk is the set of types of player j for whom accept trade is k-th level rationalizable (recall
20

that rejecting trade is always kth level rationalizable). Now consider a type ti of player i. He
will have an interim belief
Suppose tj ;

2 Ejk

i
i,

( jti ) over (tj ; ), the type of the other player and the payo¤ state.

i.e., a type payo¤ state pair where accept trade is k-th level interim

correlated rationalizable for player j and the payo¤ state is an i-gain state. Now we can endow
type ti of agent with a belief i 2 (Aj Tj
) given by
8
>
>
< i (tj ; jti ) , if aj = reject trade and (tj ; ) 6= tj ;
i (aj ; tj ; ) =
i (tj ; jti ) , if aj = accept trade and (tj ; ) = tj ;
>
>
:
0,
if
otherwise.

;
;

Clearly, accept trade is best response to this conjecture and thus (k + 1)-th level rationalizable
for type ti . Thus the induction argument for belief-free rationalizability goes through unchanged
for interim correlated rationalizability.
In the common prior case, we have
Proposition 6 (BCE in Trading Game)
In a trading game, there is a unique Bayes correlated equilibrium (and thus a unique belief
invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium) where both players always choose the safe action (reject
trade).
It is well known that trade is not possible under the common prior assumption: see Sebenius
and Geanakoplos (1983) for a statement in the bilateral risk neutral setting discussed here and
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) in a more general environment.

Arguments from this literature

immediately apply.

4.3

Informational Robustness Foundations

Now suppose that we start out with type space T and we allow each player i to observe an
additional signal si 2 Si .

Each player i has a subjective belief

i

about the distribution of

signals conditional on the type pro…les and the payo¤ state:
i

:T

!

(S) :

We make the support assumption that, for all players i and ti 2 Ti , there exists S i (ti )
that
s

X
i ;t

i;

i

((si ; s i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; )
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i

(t i ; jti ) > 0;

Si such
(7)

for each si 2 S i (ti ) and
j

((si ; s i ) jt; ) = 0;

(8)

for all j 6= i, si 2
= S i (ti ), s i , t and . The interpretation is that if player i does not think it is
possible that he will observe an additional signal si 2
= S i (ti ) if he is type ti , then no player j ever
thinks it is possible that player i observes signal si when his type is ti . This support assumption
ensures that whenever a player other than i thinks that (ti ; si ) is possible, the beliefs of player i
conditional on (ti ; si ) are well-de…ned by Bayes rule. If this assumption is not made, then players
can attach positive probability to other players being types with unde…ned beliefs.

Aumann

(1974) discussed why an assumption like this was necessary in a sensible de…nition of subjective
correlated equilibrium with an informational robustness interpretation.

This assumption was

implicit in the formulation of a correlating device in Liu (2015). We brie‡y discuss in Section
5 alternative ways of addressing this issue and the relation to "a posteriori equilibrium" in the
complete information case.
We refer to any conditional distribution of signals, (Si ;

I
i )i=1 ,

satisfying the support restriction

as an expansion of type space T . An expansion is belief-invariant if, for each player i,
s

X

i 2S i

i

((si ; s i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ;

(9)

is independent of (t i ; ). Note that this is the same de…nition as (6) applied to expansions rather
than decision rules, and it will immediately translate into belief-invariance of decision rules in
our informational robustness results.

Liu (2015) has shown that this de…nition characterizes

payo¤-irrelevance in the sense that players can observe signals without altering their beliefs and
higher-order beliefs about the state (see also Bergemann and Morris (2016a)).
I
i )i=1

Now a basic game G, a type space T and an expansion (Si ;

jointly de…ne a game of

incomplete information. A (pure) strategy for player i in this game of incomplete information
is a mapping

i

: Ti

Si ! Ai . Now strategy pro…le

is a (Bayes Nash) equilibrium if, for each

player i, ti and si 2 S i (ti ), we have
t

t

X
i ;s

i

(t i ; jti )

i

(si ; s i j ((ti ; t i ) ; )) ui

i

(t i ; jti )

i

(si ; s i j ((ti ; t i ) ; )) ui

i;

X

i ;s i ;

for all ai 2 Ai .
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i

(ti ; si ) ;

ai ;

i

i

(t i ; s i ) ;

(t i ; s i ) ;

;

(10)

Now we can formally state the informational robustness foundations for the two rationalizability solution concepts we discussed:
Proposition 7 (Informational Robustness to Payo¤-Irrelevant Signals)
Action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti of player i in (G; T ) if and only if there
exists a payo¤-irrelevant expansion Sj ;
a signal si 2 S i (ti ) such that

i

I
j j=1

of T , an equilibrium

of G; T ; Sj ;

I
j j=1

and

(ti ; si ) = ai .

Versions of this observation appear as Proposition 2 in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)
and as Lemma 2 in Liu (2015).

For completeness, and for comparison with the next Propo-

sition, we report a proof in the Appendix for the Proposition under the current notation and
interpretation.
Proposition 8 (Informational Robustness to Payo¤-Relevant Signals)
Action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti of player i in (G; T ) if and only if there exists an
expansion Sj ;
that

i

I
j j=1

of T , an equilibrium

I
j j=1

of G; T ; Sj ;

and signal si 2 S i (ti ) such

(ti ; si ) = ai .

Proof. Suppose that action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti in (G; T ).
de…nition of belief-free rationalizability, there exists, for each aj 2 BF Rj (tj ), a conjecture
(T

j

A

By the
aj ;tj
j

2

) such that

j

(1)
(2)

aj ;tj
j
X
a

j

(t j ; a j ; ) > 0 ) ak 2 BF Rk (tk ) for each k 6= j;
aj ;tj
j

(t j ; a j ; ) > 0 )

(3) aj 2 arg max
a0j

t

X

aj ;tj
j

j

(t j ; jtj ) > 0 for each t j ; ; and

(t j ; a j ; ) uj

a0j ; a

j

;

(11)

.

j ;a j ;

I
j j=1

Now consider the expansion Sj ;

of T , where Sj = Aj [ sj

and

j

:T

!

(S) is

given by

j

((sj ; s j ) j (tj ; t j ) ; ) =

8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:

sj ;tj
"
#BF Rj (tj ) j
j

(t j ; jtj )

"
s

X
j 2A

0,

(t j ; s j ; ) ,
sj ;tj
j

if s 2 BF R (t) ;

(t j ; s j ; ) , if

s=s ,

j

if

otherwise,

for some " > 0. It is always possible to construct such an expansion for su¢ ciently small " > 0
because of property (2) in (11) above.

Now, by construction, there is an equilibrium of the
23

I
j j=1

game G; T ; Sj ;

where if sj 2 S j (tj ),

j

(tj ; sj ) = sj , and

tj ; sj can be arbitrarily

j

set equal to any element of
arg max
a0j

t

X
j ;a

j
j

(t j ; jtj )

j

sj ; a j j ((tj ; t j ) ; ) uj

For the converse, suppose that there exists an expansion Sj ;
of G; T ; Sj ;

I
j j=1

a0j ; a

I
j j=1

j

;

.

of T and an equilibrium

. We will show inductively in n that, for all players j, aj 2 BF Rjn (tj )

whenever sj 2 S j (tj ) and

j

(tj ; sj ) = aj . It is true by construction for n = 0. Suppose that

it is true for n. Since sj 2 S j (tj ), equilibrium condition (10) implies that aj is a best response
to a conjecture over others’types and actions and the state. By the inductive hypothesis, this
conjecture assigns zero probability to type action pro…les (tj ; aj ) of player j where aj 2
= BF Rjn (tj ).
By construction, the marginal of this conjecture on T
of

j

( jtj ). Thus aj 2 BF Rjn+1 (tj ).

An expansion (Si ;

I
i )i=1

expanded game G; T ; (Si ;
rule

has support contained in the support

j

:T

!

satis…es the common prior assumption if
I
i )i=1

and a strategy pro…le

(A):

X

(ajt; ) =

i

is independent of i. An

for that game will induce a decision

(sj (t; )) :

f(t;s): (t;s)=ag

We record for completeness the corresponding results for expansions that satisfy the common
prior assumption.
Proposition 9 (Informational Robustness to Common Prior Payo¤-Irrelevant Signals)
If T is a common prior type space, then

is a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium

of (G; T ) if and only if there exists a payo¤-irrelevant common prior expansion (Si ;
and equilibrium

of G; T ; (Si ;

I
i )i=1

such that

I
i )i=1

of T

induces .

A subjective version of Proposition 9 appears in Liu (2015) (and the common prior case is
discussed in Section 5.2).
Proposition 10 (Informational Robustness to Common Prior Payo¤-Relevant Signals)
If T is a common prior type space, then

is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G; T ) if and only
24

if there exists a common prior expansion (Si ;
such that

I
i )i=1

of T and equilibrium

of G; T ; (Si ;

I
i )i=1

induces .

Proposition 10 appears as Theorem 2 in Bergemann and Morris (2016a).

5

Discussion: Support Assumption and a Posteriori Equilibrium

In our informational robustness foundations, an expansion was characterized by each player’s
subjective belief about how all players’signals were being (stochastically) chosen as a function
of players’types and the payo¤ state. Thus expansions were being explicitly identi…ed with new
signals that players observed. In this section, we will discuss an alternative way of describing an
expansion of the type space, one that works directly with a player i’s interim beliefs conditional
on ti and si . There are a number of reasons for doing so. First, this will highlight the signi…cance
and interpretation of the support assumption in the previous section. Second, it will clarify the
connection to the prior literature. Finally, it will provide a step towards explaining the relation
between "informational robustness" and "epistemic" foundations of solution concepts.
Suppose that we started with a type space T = (Ti ;

I
i )i=1

but now consider a di¤erent de-

…nition of an expanded type space (which will reduce to the previous one under additional
I
assumptions). An expanded type space will take the form Te = Tei ; ei
where Tei
Ti Si
i=1

and, for each i and ti 2 Ti , there exists si 2 Si such that tei = (ti ; si ) : What can we say about

possible equilibrium behavior on such an expanded type space? We have built into this formu-

lation the assumption that all possible types are rational with respect to some beliefs, and, in
this sense, this formulation captures the idea of a posteriori equilibrium, the version of subjective
correlated equilibrium introduced by Aumann (1974) and applied in Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987). If we impose no restrictions on how the beliefs of (ti ; si ) on the expanded type space relate to the beliefs of ti on the original type space, then the original type space becomes irrelevant.
In particular, say that an action is ex post rationalizable in the basic game G if it survives an
iterative deletion procedure where, at each round, we delete actions that are not a best response
given any conjecture over surviving actions and payo¤ states.
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Formally, let EP Ri0 = Ai , let

EP Rin+1 be the set of actions for which there exists

i

2

(A

) such that

i

(a i ; ) > 0 ) aj 2 EP Rjn for each j 6= i,
X
0
(2) ai 2 arg max
i (a i ; ) ui ((ai ; a i ) ; ) ;
(1)

i

a0i

a

i;

and let
EP Ri =

\

EP Rin .

n 1

This solution concept characterizes actions that can be played in equilibrium on any expanded
type space if we dropped the support assumption from the analysis of the previous section.
This motivates putting additional restrictions on the expanded type space.

We start by

imposing a weak restriction that will correspond to the support assumption in the previous
section: a player’s beliefs on the original type space are not contradicted by his beliefs on the
expanded type space. Thus
X
s

i

ei ((t i ; s i ; ) jti ; si ) > 0 )

i

((t i ; ) jti ) > 0.

(12)

Restriction (12) reduces to the support restriction as de…ned in the previous section. De…ne
o
e
Si (ti ) = si 2 Si (ti ; si ) 2 Ti ,
n

and
i

whenever

i

((si ; s i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) =

((t i ; ) jti ) > 0 and

i

ei ((t i ; s i ; ) jti ; si )
1
#Si (ti )
i ((t i ; ) jti )

( j (ti ; t i ) ; ) is an arbitrary distribution otherwise.

(12) implies
X
s

i

i

((si ; s i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; )

i

((t i ; ) jti ) =

for each ti and si 2 Si (ti ), and so
s

X

i ;t i ;

i

((si ; s i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; )

i

((t i ; ) jti ) =

X
1
ei ((t i ; s i ; ) jti ; si )
#Si (ti ) s
i

X
1
ei ((t i ; s i ; ) jti ; si )
#Si (ti ) s ;t ;

1
#Si (ti )
> 0;

=
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i

i

(13)
Now

which is the support assumption.

belief-invariance in the formulation of the previous section

adds the requirement on the current expanded type space that
X
s

for each i, t i , , ti and si .

i

ei (t i ; s i ; jti ; si ) = ei (t i ; jti )

We noted earlier that a posteriori equilibrium from Aumann (1974) and Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987) was equivalent to asking what can happen on all expanded type spaces in the case
of complete information. But in the case of incomplete information –in the sense of there being
many payo¤ states – we saw that the original type no longer mattered.

Imposing either the

weaker support assumption or the belief-invariance assumption are the natural generalizations
of a posteriori equilibrium. Ex post rationalizability, like belief-free rationalizability and interim
correlated rationalizability, reduces to correlated rationalizability in complete information games.
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti
in (G; T ). By the de…nition of interim correlated rationalizability, there exists, for each player
aj ;tj
j

j and aj 2 ICRj (tj ), a conjecture
(1)
(2)

aj ;tj
j

X
a

aj ;tj
j

(t j ; a j ; ) =

j

a0j

Now consider the expansion Sj ;

whenever

j

(T

j

A

j

) such that

(t j ; a j ; ) > 0 ) ak 2 ICRk (tk ) for each k 6= j;

(3) aj 2 arg max

j

2

t

X

j ;a

I
j j=1

j

aj ;tj
j

(t j ; jtj ) for each t j ; ; and

(t j ; a j ; ) uj

a0j ; a

;

j

.

j;

of T , where Sj = Aj and

((aj ; a j ) j (tj ; t j ) ; ) =

8
<
:

aj ;tj
(t j ;a j ;
j
j (t j ;

)
,
jtj ) #ICRj (tj )

0;

j

:T

!

(S) satis…es

if a 2 ICR (t) ;
if

otherwise;

(t j ; jtj ) > 0. Now, by construction, there is an equilibrium of the game (G; T ; Sj ;

where
j

(tj ; aj ) = aj ;

for all j, tj and aj 2 ICRj (tj ).
For the converse, suppose that there exists an expansion Sj ;
(G; T ; Sj ;
j

I
j j=1 ).

I
j j=1

of T , an equilibrium

of

We will show inductively in n that, for all players j, aj 2 ICRjn (tj ) whenever

(tj ; sj ) = aj for some sj 2 S j (tj ). It is true by construction for n = 0. Suppose that it is

true for n. Equilibrium condition (10) implies that aj is a best response to a conjecture over
others’types and actions and the state. By the inductive hypothesis, this conjecture assigns zero
probability to type action pro…le (tk ; ak ) of player k 6= j with ak 2
= ICRkn (tk ). By construction,
the marginal on T

j

is equal to

j

( jtj ). Thus aj 2 ICRjn+1 (tj ).
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